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FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8932  
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0001  
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0367  
RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO PRIORITY 0003  
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0025  
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0004  
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0263  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 8921  
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0989  
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1514  
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0018  
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0062  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 3552  
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0276  
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0262  
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0642  
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 1112  
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY  
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0594  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1427  
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0211  
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0267  
RUEHKR/AMEMBASSY KOROR PRIORITY 0029  
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0004  
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0988  
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 0067  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1757  
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY 0063  
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 0498  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1118  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1454  
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RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0258  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000102

SIPDIS

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SENSITIVE

DOS FOR ISN/WMDT DEXTER INGRAM AND T TIM KATSAPIS AND EAP  
DHS FOR TOM MCILVAIN

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [PTER](#) [EAIR](#) [ETRD](#) [EWWT](#) [PREL](#) [AS](#)

SUBJECT: GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM -  
AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE ON MODEL GUIDELINES WORKSHOP

REF: 2007 STATE 156602

**¶1.** (U) Australia's plan to participate in the March GI Model Guidelines Document Workshop in Washington was confirmed to Poloffs by Mohan Mathews, Executive Director, Counter-Terrorism Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Section, International Security Division, DFAT, during a February 6 meeting. The exact composition of the delegation has not yet been finalized, but participants likely will include the relevant agency representatives from the Australian Embassy in Washington, including Australian Customs, DFAT, and ASIO. Katherine Smith from the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO), who was recently assigned to Washington, is also likely to participate.

**¶2.** (U) Mohan also provided GOA views on the draft model nuclear detection guidelines document that we had shared with Australia in November (Reftel). The GOA interagency group that studied the document suggested that a drafting process using a sub-group of the GI member nations might be easier to manage than soliciting inputs from the entire membership and

asked if that was anticipated. It recommended the document provide general guidance which can be used as a checklist and to avoid prescriptive guidelines. The group had concerns that the guidelines may limit implementation to specific equipment or manufacturers to achieve interoperability or compatibility, for example specifying use of specific instruments to measure radiation. It cautioned the guidelines should not be so restrictive as to discourage or discontinue opportunities to share field experience or laboratory evaluations.

**¶3.** (U) The interagency group stressed the importance of avoiding duplication of related efforts in other international organizations. Australia specifically wishes to ensure that the current revision process for the IAEA's "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" document (INFCIRC/225) continue unencumbered. QFacilities" document (INFCIRC/225) continue unencumbered. They also observe that IAEA's recent publication "Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Material" (IAEA NSS No 6, 2007) covers similar issues including radiation detection equipment and response measures. It also underlined the importance of leaving the role of setting standards to established bodies such as the IAEA and the World Customs Organization, with the guidelines simply referencing those standards.

**¶4.** (U) Mohan requested more information about the referenced U.S. regional partnership with Canada and Mexico as a basis for working with Pacific regional partners to enhance radiological/nuclear detection capabilities. He also

CANBERRA 00000102 002 OF 002

inquired if we were aware of any similar efforts that have been initiated by the EU. Post would appreciate further information on these issues.

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